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REGULATORY TAKINGS AND "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY" 
J. Peter Byrne· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The necessity for judicial restraint in. constitutional inter-
pretation has been a persistent theme for more than a century. 
Judges, from Holmes and Brandeis to Harlan and Souter, legal 
theorists, from Thayer to Bickel to Bork to Sunstein, and politi-
cians, from Roosevelt to Nixon to Governor Bush,l have decried 
the propensity of courts to read personal political philosophies 
into vague constitutional provisions so as to frustrate democratic 
lawmaking. Reaction to what Raoul Berger famously termed 
"Government by Judiciary"2 has spawned pungent dissents, 
proposals to restructure (or "pack") the Supreme Court, bills to 
strip courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, and concerted efforts 
to impeach Justices. 
The thesis of this Article is that the Court of Federal Claims 
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have become 
exposed to this classic critique of constitutional decision-making 
through the recent expansions of the regulatory takings doc-
trine. Though the chief agent for this expansion has been the 
Supreme COurt,3 these lower courts have made their own promi-
nent contributions to broadening regulatory takings, and they 
are far more vulnerable to political reprisals. Like the Due Pro-
cess Clause in the. gilded age, the Takings Clause today can 
easily be and has been seen as an avenue for inappropriate judi-
cial protection of established wealth and commercial practices 
* Georgetown University Law Center 
1. See Mike Allen, Bush Draws Donations, and Conservatives' Fire, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 1999, at A26. 
2. RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
3. See Philip Weinberg, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: Will the Su-
preme Court Stretch the Takings Clause Beyond the Breaking Point?, 26 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 315, 315 (1999). 
949 
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frustrating legitimate efforts at reform.4 Courts addressing 
claims of regulatory takings should proceed with caution, prac-
tice available "passive virtues," and ground decisions firmly in 
precedent and established constitutional values. 
This Article will first examine the elements of substantive 
due process that led to decisions invalidating social welfare 
legislation and becoming notorious for judicial overreaching. 
This Article will then show how decisions expanding the regula-
tory takings doctrine share very similar characteristics. Finally, 
it will offer some suggestions about how judges concerned about 
real or apparent overreaching should approach regulatory tak-
ings issues. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL 
INVALIDATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
One of the most eloquent critiques of excessive judicial law-
making is The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy,s written by 
Robert Jackson in 1940, and published shortly before his eleva-
tion to the Supreme Court. In it, Jackson chronicled the devel-
opment of the Court's jurisprudence concerning substantive due 
process and the Commerce Clause that enabled it to hold uncon-
stitutional a wide array of state and federal social welfare stat-
utes designed to regulate the terms and conditions of labor. This 
assumption of judicial power culminated in the great legal con-
flicts concerning the New Deal, Roosevelt's proposal to increase 
the size of the Court, and the Court's abandonment of its role as 
guardian of laissez faire in 1937.6 Jackson's argument was that 
the Court imperiled the Constitution itself when it repeatedly 
frustrated democratic majorities' lawmaking without a secure 
foundation in the language or explicit policies of the Constitu-
tion.7 The Court he joined gave Congress and the state legisla-
4. See generally Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A 
Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REv. 509 (1998). 
5. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). 
6. See David M. O'Brien, The Great Judicial Stall: The Courts Were Meant To 
Be Above Politics but They Have Been Turned into an Arena of Ideological Combat, 
LA TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at Ml. 
7. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 320-24. 
HeinOnline -- 51 Ala. L. Rev. 951 1999-2000
2000] Regulatory Takings & "Judicial Supremacy" 951 
. 
tures wide discretion in enacting economic and social legislation. 
Of course, we know that the Court during the service of 
Chief Justice Warren greatly expanded judicial power by broadly 
construing the Bill of Rights to promote social equality and indi-
vidual civil liberties.8 We also know that many of its decisions 
were highly controversial and created a political backlash that 
persists to this day.9 Both of Richard Nixon's successful presi-
dential campaigns stressed his commitment to appointing Justic-
es who were "strict constructionists" and interpreted the Consti-
tution rather than inventing new rights that furthered their 
individual political visions.10 Modem conservative constitution-
al theory has embraced "original meaning" largely in response to 
the perceived excesses of subjectivity by the Warren and Burger 
Courts. The rhetoric of "original meaning" persists to this day in 
political discourse, surfacing most recently in Governor Bush's 
response to questions about his position on abortion rights.l1 
The current Supreme Court has persistently narrowed its 
reading of individual constitutional rights in virtually every ar-
ea-with the conspicuous exception of property rights under the 
Takings Clause. 
What are the elements of judicial decision-making th~t fuel 
such controversy and claims of illegitimacy? There appear to be 
three major elements. 
First, undoubtedly the most frequently mentioned objection 
is that judges broadly construe vague provisions with weak or no 
foundation in the Constitution's text or history. As Jackson 
wrote: 
[Electoral majorities] should, of course, be so restrained where 
[their] program violates clear and explicit terms of the Constitu-
tion, such as the specific prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. But to 
use vague clauses to import doctrines of restraint, such as "free-
dom of contract," is to set up the judiciary as a check on elections, 
a nullification of the process of government by consent of the gov-
erned.12 • 
8. See I!avid Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of Right, 34 BARv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 8 (1999). 
9. See id. at 7. 
10. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at M1. 
11. See Allen, supra note 1, at A26. 
12. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 319. 
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More recently, Justice Scalia has argued vigorously against the 
use of substantive due, process to maintain constitutional abor-
tion' rights.13 While praising the abandonment of substantive 
due process during the New Deal crisis in 1937/4 he chided an 
"Imperial Judiciary"15 for making constitutional decisions based 
on "philosophical predilection and moral intuition,,16 concerning 
issues properly left to the political process.17 He saw the result 
of such judicial frustration of the political process as being the 
politicization of judicial selection. IS He concluded: 
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this 
issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum 
that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a 
fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of 
a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, 
the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.19 
This is no place to enter into the debate about the proper 
scope of the Due Process Clause. But critics like Jackson and 
Scalia certainly can point out that the Clause makes no specific 
reference to contracting or abortion, but merely uses the word 
"liberty," in such a context as to cast doubt on whether the 
Clause has any substantive content at all. Moreover, it is very 
difficult to argue that the Framers of the.Fourteenth Amend-
ment intended to restrict the powers of legislatures to make 
laws improving employment conditions for workers. Judges thus 
were restrained neither by the text nor the understood purposes 
of the Amendment. This lack of direction from the Framers 
conferred great discretion on judges to pick and choose the in-
stances where invalidation was warranted, increasing both judi-
cial power and'the appearance of subjectivity. 
Second, the judicial position could easily be seen as opposi-
tion to a broad movement of social reform trying to change law 
13-. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). " 
14. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 998. 
15. [d. at 996. 
16. [d. at 1000. 
17. See id. at 1002. 
18. See id. at 100l. 
19. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 1002. 
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through political mobilization and legislation. In terms of the old 
substantive due prQcess, judges had arrayed themselves against 
progressive era efforts to improve the terms and conditions of 
work. Similarly, recent abortion decisions can be understood, 
indeed have justified themselves, as stands against "right to life" 
political mobilization.20 It is striking that poth Jackson's book 
and Scalia's Casey dissent end by invoking the disaster of the 
Dred Scott case,21 in which the Court sought to thwart abolition 
and free soil movements and remove the slavery question from 
politics, but actually brought the Civil War closer as well as the 
consequent eclipse of judicial power. Judges seen as political 
agents will not be respected, and law becomes the continuation 
of political war by other means. Moreover, given that the posi-
tion being defended by the courts has lost in the political pro-
cess, judges will be seen as defenders of an ancien regime head-
ed for the last ditch. 
The other side of this coin is that judicial power may be 
exerted on behalf of a controversial normative theory having at 
best a partial. foundation in the Constitution. Of course, Dred 
Scott claimed that the federal government lacked power to re-
strict or end slavery.22 The economic substantive due process 
cases are notoriously said· to enshrine the social Darwinism of 
Herbert Spencer,23 and they plainly privileged the view that 
government could not moraUy redistribute bargaining power nor 
wealth. While these theories understandably animated political 
debate at the time, the Court's decisions sought to privilege the 
values they embraced as constitutionally inviolate.24 
Finally, economic substantive due process decisions tended 
to elevate the common law above statutes, with an emphasis on 
liberty of contract. In practice, this often meant that limitations 
20. See id. at 865-69; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
22. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. 
23. See Anthony S. McCaskey, Thesis and Antithesis of Liberty of Contract: Ex-
cess in Lochner and Johnson Controls, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 409, 437-40 (1993). 
24. Here the recent book by CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999), seems most pertinent. Sunstein extols a 
form of judicial "minimalism," which seeks to promote democratic discourse. by not 
attempting to- finally settle large or deep philosophical debates, but rather, by find-
ing common ground among opposing views through narrow decisions. [do at 259. 
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on contracting originating. in the common law or ancient ordi-
nances were upheld, but those fashioned by statute to meet 
modern concerns were suspect. Thus, the Statute of Frauds was 
valid, but laws regulating the wage and hour terms of an em-
ployment contract were not.25 In' the latter case, the rules of 
common law contract and the scope of freedom it contemplated 
took precedence over otherwise valid statutes.26 The Constitu-
tion, then, was used to reverse the nprmal constitution~ pre-
sumption. that statutes are to prevail over common law. The 
precedence of judges over legislatures thus mounted to.a second 
degree. 
III. THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE IN A SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS CONTEXT 
In this Section, this Article argues that recent developments 
in the regulatory takings .doctrine share in all the problems 
associated with substantive due process. Indeed, regulatory 
takings sometimes seems to be the very same doctrine as sub-
stantive due process, attached to a different clause only as an 
alias to avoid the obloquy in which substantive due process is 
held. If there is more than a passing resemblance, then courts 
shop.ld be concerned about the political dynamic that they are 
setting in motion. . 
Let me settle preliminarily a small point of rhetoric. It 
sometimes is asserted that a finding that the government must 
pay just compensation. does not limit the regulatory power of 
government at all, but merely provides. monetary protection to 
the individual. This is deeply unpersuasive. First, such a deci-
sion holds that the government cannot do what it has purported 
to do, that is, regulate and not pay compensation. Second, as a 
practical matter, the government cannot afford to pay compensa-
tion broadly, and the threat of having to do so effectively con-
strains policy choices, as has been happening in several areas, 
such as endangered species. protection.27 Finally, Eastern Enter-
25. See McCaskey, supra note 23, at 431. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 53 (1905); Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
26. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
27. See generally Weinberg, supra note 3, at 315; Jonathan Baert Weiner, Glob· 
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prises28 has merely confirmed what had seemed so-that invali-
datiop. is an alternative remedy to the grant of compensation.29 
There are several vices that ~egulatory takings and substan-
tive due process share. First, the regulatory takings doctrine is 
very vague and rests on no textual or historical support. The 
vagueness is legendary-no body of constitutional doctrine has 
had more synonyms for imprecision attached to it.30 The Su-
preme Court itself has said that there is no real test but only a 
fact-specific inquiry into various unweighted factors.31 This 
gives individual judges great discretion and regularly results in 
decisions being attributed to the predilections of individual judg-
es rather than to the logic of doctrine or precedent. 
The language of the Takings Clause says nothing about 
excessive· regulatory burdens; indeed, the word "take" denotes 
some change in possession or title. Historical research has estab-
lished beyond reasonable dispute that the Framers intended the 
Clause only to apply to physical seizures.32 Courts consistently 
so interpreted the Clause for more than 100 years, until the 
Court, in thrall to substantive due process, invented regulatory 
takings in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal.33 Justice Scalia conceded 
in Lucas34 that contemporary historical understanding did not 
support the notion of a regulatory taking; he merely gestured at 
some unidentified "historical compact" that does not exist.35 As 
for the text, Scalia merely claimed that since the text can be 
read to include regulatory takings, he would not overrule Penn-
sylvania Coal.3s But "liberty" in the Due 'Process Clause can be 
just as easily read to include making employment contracts or 
having an abortion. It is ironic that Justice Scalia's opinion in 
al Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 
(1999). 
28. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
29. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521-22. 
30. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) 
(noting that the question of what constitutes a regulatory taking for the purpose of 
the Fifth Amendment "has proved to be a problem of considerable diffiCulty"). 
31. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 523. 
32.· See William Michael Treanor, The Originnl Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995). 
33. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v_ Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). 
34. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
35. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n.15. 
36. See id. at 1017-18. 
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Lucas should follow his dissent in Casey, since he violates in the 
latter all the principles of constitutional adjudication he extols 
in the former. 
Second, vigorous enforcement of the regulatory takings 
doctrine has been and easily can be seen as an effort to oppose 
the environmental movement as it is broadly understood.37 The 
most contentious cases arise when government regulation seeks 
to prevent development of land or water in order to preserve 
ecological or aesthetic benefits that the resource provides in its 
natural state. Restructuring legal relations to protect ecological 
values poses two challenges to traditional notions about the 
primacy of individual property rights. First, many common uses 
of land and water can be shown to harm the environment, dem-
onstrating a ubiquitous "police power" rationale for limiting 
property use. Second, acknowledging ethical duties to preserve 
natural elements shifts the moral perspective on individual 
property claims from defense of the individual against the collec-
tive to defense of commercial values against ecological values. 
The doctrine of the takings cases seems designed to abridge the 
"police power" ground for sustaining environmental regulation, 
and the rhetoric of the cases seems intended to submerge legal 
doubts about the virtue of property rights. 
The political origins of the regulatory takings revival have 
been frequently noted. The concept seems to have been reborn in 
the Reagan Justice Department and achieved its first legal real-
ization in Executive Order 12,630 in 1988.38 In recent years, 
bills to broaden and facilitate regulatory takings claims lIave 
been advanced in Congress repeatedly by members having close 
ties to extractive industries and to the National Association of 
Homebuilders.39 While all this activity is perfectly legitimate, it 
creates a context in which expansion of the doctrine by judges 
can be seen as part of a larger political campaign to weaken 
environmental restrictions. Moreover, the acceptability of judi-
cial expansion may be affected by the repeated political defeat of 
similar ideas. 
There is another side of the coin here, too. Much of the 
37. See J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239, 247 (1990). 
38. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. § 554 (1989). 
39. See Kendall, supra note 4, at 550. 
HeinOnline -- 51 Ala. L. Rev. 957 1999-2000
2000] Regulatory Takings & "Judicial Supremacy" 957 
energy behind the promotion of regulatory takings stems from 
an ardent belief in a jejune form of ,political libertarianism.40 
Under this view, every man remains an island until he chooses 
to come ashore; the individual owner's choices about what to do 
with his or her land overwhelm the concerns of neighbors about 
what the effects on them will be. Proponents view the Takings 
Clause as a broad .guarantee against wealth redistribution and 
an economic check against legislative social engineering. Again, 
the people may rightly complain if a doctrine repeatedly routed 
in the political process should become constitutionally mandato,. 
ry through judicial construction. 
Third, regulatory takings rulings tend to elevate an ideal-
ized common law concept of property over the reach of statutes 
and regulations. Regulatory takings require some baseline of 
permitted property use that is privileged over regulatory restric-
tions; that privileging is found in the common law notion that, 
at least as regards land, an owner may make any use of his or 
her land that is not a nuisance.41 Yet a statute restricting use 
simply changes the use rights that an owner has. Why should 
the common law scope be preferred to the statutory? 
Finally, it should be noted that recent developments further 
blur any distinction between substantive due process and regu-
latory takings. First, the plurality in Eastern Enterprises would 
permit a regulatory takings claim to be based upon a require-
ment to pay money without there being any specific item 
claimed to have been even metaphorically taken.42 It is inter-
esting to note that Justice O'Connor justified the use of the Tak-
ings Clause in such circumstances, not on any point of principle, 
but because of the ill repute surrounding substantive due pro-
cess;43 a cardin~ point of this Article is that regulatory takings 
ought not enjoy higher repute than substantive due process and 
may not long do so. Second, as noted above, the plurality also 
confirmed greater overlap in the remedies offered under the two 
Clauses, permitting invalidation as the remedy in a takings 
40. See Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recov-
ering Our Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 507, 542-44 (1993). 
41. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 112-25 (1985). 
42. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 531-32. 
43. See id. at 537. 
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case.44 Finally, there is the growing use of a means-ends test 
for assessing a regulatory taking that imports just the doctrinal 
touchstones long used to find social and economic legislation to 
have violated substantive due process.45 
IV. POTENTIAL JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE LAw OF 
REGULATORY TAKINGS 
A judge on the Court of Federal Claims might be concerned 
about either the reality or the perception of the problems this 
article has outlined. He or she might doubt the propriety of his 
or her authority to require compensation for many forms of 
deliberate regulation, or he or she may worry that the . public or 
the bar will view the court as exercising excessive judicial con-
trol over democratic decision making. But the Supreme Court 
has fostered regulatory takings and retroactivity doctrines and 
the judges have a duty, of course, to follow the law laid down. In 
this Section, this Article offers a few suggestions, hardly novel, 
about how such a judge may proceed. These are adaptations of 
the traditional "passive virtues," and others could add to the list. 
First, it has been admirable and prudent for the court to 
seek a range of contemporary scholarly views about the charac-
ter of these issues and the responses being discussed. Such anal-
ysis ought to have a broader perspective than can be gained in 
litigating individual cases. We can hope that whatever will be 
done will be done now with greater sensitivity and adroitness. 
Second, perhaps because regulatory takings cases center on 
such an extraordinary exercise of judicial power, they are sur-
rounded by a broad array of prudential doctrines designed to 
forestall or postpone judicial entry into the regulatory thicket. 
The best known among these is ripeness, whereby the court 
takes extraordinary care to await final agency action that indi-
cates just what use will be permitted the landowner.46 But ripe-
44. See id. at 52l. 
45. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause is 
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1650-51 (1988); see also Nollan 
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-42 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
46. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 187 (1985). 
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ness stands as well for a more general respect for agency respon-
sibility and a determination not to require constitutional com-
pensation when a lesser legal ruling can achieve justice for the 
parties:i7 This is analogous to the Supreme Court's preference 
for resolving cases short of constitutional decision. . 
Third, when a judge believes that a regulatory taking has 
occurred, the decision should be narrowly based on the particu-
lar facts of the case. The ad hoc, fact-bound nature of most tak-
ings cases facilitates and often requires this. But such an ap-
proach also provides some respite from the concerns that ani-
mate this Article. Narrow decisions that rest on peculiar facts 
displace less democratically authorized decision-making. The 
court should attempt to deal with a particular government deci-
sion rather than a substantive program or a class of decisions. 
This permits revision of a program to avoid excessive burdens or 
other constitutional flaws, without also eliminating the program. 
Such decisions also keep the constitutional razor further from 
legislative determinations, focusing less on the challenging stat-
utory authorization and more on specific application. As a corol-
lary, the court should scrupulously avoid denigrating legislative 
purposes. 
Fourth, reasoning in regulatory takings decisions should 
remain within the categories authorized by the Supreme Court 
and not improvise. Here, I want to draw on Professor Sunstein's 
conditional praise for constitutional decisions with "shallow" 
reasoning; he points out that avoiding complete theorization of a 
constitutional problem will permit many competing theories to 
persist in legal and political discourse, thereby minimizmg the 
costs of mistakes, such as backing the wrong theory.48 This ad-
vice seems quite pertinent to regulatory takings cases, where 
many theories compete and all have been roundly criticized. An 
example of an unfortunate doctrinal innovation close to home 
was the Federal Circuit's embrace of the idea of "partial tak-
ings," which stimulated harsh critiques and has been uniformly 
47. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). 
48. SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 18-19, 43-45. 
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rejected by other COurtS;49 the case, Florida Rock,50 surely 
could have been decided adequately under a standard Penn Cen-
tral51 analysis. 
A much worse move would be for a court to aggressively 
promote the type of libertarian theory of the Takings Clause 
mentioned above. Such a course would have the goal of removing 
from political debate a host of questions concerning what is due 
a private owner when the public asserts through the national 
democratic processes its interests in how private property may 
be developed. It also would, of course, significantly raise the bar 
for tolerating retroactivity. Without doubt, I believe that such a 
legal development would be legally and normatively wrong. But 
what I want to emphasize is how destructive it would be to 
traditional and bipartisan notions of the separation of powers, to 
insist on judicial supremacy once again over the environmental 
and social policies of the nation. The consequences of this con-
flict cannot be predicted, but history suggests that they could be 
far-reaching and prolonged. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional adjudication has a political and jurispruden-
tial complexity beyond that of statutory interpretation. Broad 
constitutional decisions forestall ordinary political processes and 
remove topics from popular arenas. Thus, they generate contro-
versy different in kind from that incumbent upon difficult statu-
tory cases, even when large sums or individual liberty is at 
stake. This controversy, which focuses on the legitimacy of the 
courts, is exacerbated when such decisions lack persuasive an-
chor in the Constitution's text or traditions. This is not to say 
that such decisions are never appropriate; rather, such decisions 
require great reflection and tact. 
The Court of Federal Claims has a significant challenge 
before it. It should be congratulated for approaching this chal-
49. See Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Proper-
ty, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 
ENVTL. L. 171, 180 (1995); Kendall & Lord, supra note 4, at 561-71. 
50. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
51. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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lenge by looking to broad themes and seeking counsel. Hopefully 
these comments will" assist in the analysis of this challenge. 
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